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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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CONTENTS

25X1

2. Dominican Republic: The military establishment remains, next to Communist-subversive issue, one of major obstacles to political settlement. (Page 4)

3. USSR: Kosygin's speech does not appreciably advance commitment to aid North Vietnam. (Page 5)

25X1

5. Greece: New government's prospects seem to be worsening. (Page 7)

6. Note: Mauritania. (Page 8)

25X1

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400150001-2

*Dominican Republic: [The problem of the Dominican military establishment remains, next to the Communist-subversive issue, one of the thorniest obstacles to a political settlement.]

[The top commanders of the loyalist military forces have agreed with the OAS committee on the necessity for the replacement of the Imbert government with a new provisional government headed by Hector Garcia Godoy. However, they have conditioned this with an insistence that Garcia Godoy pledge not to make any military command changes for the duration of his government.]

[Garcia Godoy regards the loyalist position as unacceptable and considers it a military attempt to maintain a "government within a government." He is toying with the idea of expanding his contacts with key military leaders in secondary posts in an effort to undercut the commanders.

[There are some military leaders who recognize the widespread public antimilitary sentiment and who concede that major changes in the military structure are required. Colonel Juan Folch, the senior military officer in the important north central portion of the country, stated last week that the most important thing which the proposed provisional government must do is to rid the armed forces of "smugglers, thieves, and other nefarious elements."]

[Colonel Benoit, the military member of the Imbert junta, has stated that the military's history of interfering in Dominican politics has been the "curse" of the country.]

25X1

19 July 65

4

USSR: Soviet Premier Kosygin's most recent denunciation of US actions in Vietnam was relatively aggressive and hard hitting, but did not appreciably advance Moscow's standard commitment to assist North Vietnam.

Kosygin concluded a 17 July speech in Riga with a harsh indictment of the "extremely dangerous" course of US policy. Reflecting Soviet sensitivity to reports that the US is planning a significant increase in its military assistance to Saigon, the Soviet premier warned against "raising the stakes." He included a vague threat that "every new aggressive act" will be met with appropriate resistance and aid "by the forces of national liberation and the Socialist states."

Kosygin's strong remarks may have been designed, in part, to counter expected Chinese accusations that his recent meeting with Ambassador Harriman indicates further Soviet attempts to find "a way out" for the US in Vietnam. Pro-Chinese Albania has already levied this charge.

To balance his remarks, however, Kosygin bemoaned the fact that the Vietnam situation "prevents the relaxation of international tension." He stressed that Moscow's policies include "actions on behalf of disarmament" and world peace as well as "firm defense" against "imperialist aggression." Moreover, Kosygin made no effort to maintain the impression that US policies in Vietnam could lead to the allocation of larger shares of Soviet resources to the Soviet military.

Instead, he explicitly reaffirmed that investment in, and industrial support for, agriculture is to be greatly increased as outlined by party first secretary Brezhnev in March. He gave the impression that economic priorities for defense, for agriculture, and for raising the standard of living will remain unchanged.

25X1

19 July 65

5

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400150001-2

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Greece: The new government's prospects seem to be worsening, and the King could turn to another leader of the majority Center Union (EK).

Indications are increasing that the Athanasiadis-Novas government will not be able to obtain sufficient parliamentary support to survive a vote of confidence. Several members of the cabinet expressed discouragement with the lack of support from EK deputies. Many are probably influenced by ousted premier Papandreou's active campaign against the new government.

25X1

[redacted] the King may be considering appointing former deputy premier Stephanopoulos to the premiership should the present government fall. Stephanopoulos is said to have remained out of the new government because he believed it would fail.]

[A government headed by Stephanopoulos might also have the support of both of the principal EK newspapers. One has so far been critical of the King and the new administration.]

[The approval of Stephanopoulos or anyone else as an acceptable compromise premier would still leave the basic problem of royal intervention in politics unresolved.]

25X1

19 July 65

7

NOTE

Mauritania: President Moktar plans to announce his government's recognition of Communist China early this week despite a previous agreement to accept the credentials of the first Chinese Nationalist ambassador who is scheduled to arrive tomorrow. The US Embassy believes Moktar is convinced that the prospect of Chinese Communist aid and the approval of his action by radical Arab and African states will offset the disadvantages of a break with the Nationalists. Chinese Communist diplomats are already on the scene, including Peiping's ambassador to Tunis who arrived in Nouakchott on 16 July.

25X1

19 July 65

8

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400150001-2

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